2.0 -//Pentabarf//Schedule//EN PUBLISH JNQAQS@@program.wiccon.nl -JNQAQS WICCON Opening en en 20261029T100000 20261029T100500 0.00500 WICCON Opening PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 25 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/JNQAQS/ Main Hall PUBLISH GMWX3Q@@program.wiccon.nl -GMWX3Q Will the train stop running? The value of responsible disclosure. en en 20261029T100500 20261029T103000 0.02500 Will the train stop running? The value of responsible disclosure. We had already conducted a risk analysis that highlighted several severe cybersecurity risks, and even though the risks were known, everyone was still surprised when an actual responsible disclosure message came in, notifying us about the vulnerability. We will show you how we handled this incident, what we learned, and how responsible disclosure helped accelerate the mitigation of cybersecurity risks. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 25 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/GMWX3Q/ Main Hall Ola Jankowska Catharine de Jong PUBLISH YTMLW9@@program.wiccon.nl -YTMLW9 How to capitalise on other people’s popularity to distribute malware: Weaponizing CI/CD Pipelines en en 20261029T103000 20261029T112000 0.05000 How to capitalise on other people’s popularity to distribute malware: Weaponizing CI/CD Pipelines Vulnerabilities are not only in your source code. They can hide in the deepest dependency of your project, in a build script, in a tool one of your dev uses. Every single piece of your software supply chain could impact the artefact you distribute. Including the pipelines you trust, the very pipelines that help you develop faster and secure your codebase. Maybe you should check on those to avoid distributing malware without even knowing it... I’m going to show you various methods I’ve used to compromise popular open-source packages by exploiting their GitHub Actions workflows, or those of their dependencies. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 50 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/YTMLW9/ Main Hall Garance PUBLISH 9WMN9B@@program.wiccon.nl -9WMN9B Hauntology in the Machine: Reanimating a Dead Language to Blindside Modern Security en en 20261029T113000 20261029T122000 0.05000 Hauntology in the Machine: Reanimating a Dead Language to Blindside Modern Security Today, most security tools only look at the top layers of our computers; AI security tools, monitoring Windows APIs, and checking operating system logs. But what happens when an attacker entirely bypasses this framework by diving straight to the bottom floor (the machine code)? ​ No deep prior knowledge of low-level programming is required for this talk. We will break down the research step-by-step, explaining basic concepts like compilers and shells, making this session completely beginner-friendly. The technical foundation of this presentation is based on the fascinating offensive research by security researcher Josh Stone. ​Together, we will analyze this unique technique: injecting a fully functional compiler into just 5KB of shellcode. Instead of using modern languages, this technique resurrects FORTH, a minimalist language from the 1970s. ​A traditional compiler like GCC is a massive software system that needs to parse code into complex trees and link external libraries. FORTH does none of this. It functions simply as a command shell. Because the execution logic is so small, the entire compiler easily fits into a tiny piece of shellcode. ​This is where philosophy meets reality. Derrida’s concept of 'hauntology' describes how ghosts of the past return to life to disrupt the present. By bringing back this "dead" language, hackers create temporary tools that modern endpoint scanners cannot see. When a hacker sends basic commands to this injected compiler, it talks directly to the CPU. ​Join this session to see how digging up ancient code can completely blindside modern security tools. And remember: next time your SIEM dashboard stays quiet but you hear a strange noise coming from your computer, it might just be the ghost of 1970 compiling inside your machine. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 50 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/9WMN9B/ Main Hall Marijke Moolenaar PUBLISH F3BVAN@@program.wiccon.nl -F3BVAN Humour, your Secret Weapon for more effective Cybersecurity Awareness en en 20261029T133000 20261029T135500 0.02500 Humour, your Secret Weapon for more effective Cybersecurity Awareness Cybersecurity awareness is not all fun and games, but adding a bit of fun to the mix could be very beneficial! Humour can be a very effective tool in creating a stronger connection with the people you're trying to reach with your awareness campaigns. Intuitively we understand that humour can help us bring the message across, form allies within the organisation and stand out from corporate communication messages. But this presentation take you back to why it is effective, especially with the rise of AI. We'll take a short tour to different parts of the world to see what humour looks like in different cultures. Humour that misses the point can also hurt your campaign. If you believe cybersecurity awareness could benefit from a more lighthearted approach, this presentation gives you a foundation to convince the ney-sayers in your organisation, and help you create more effective awareness campaigns. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 25 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/F3BVAN/ Main Hall Rosanne Pouw PUBLISH G3LJMT@@program.wiccon.nl -G3LJMT No IT is no IT problem en en 20261029T140000 20261029T145000 0.05000 No IT is no IT problem Kim van Wilgen examines how hidden dependencies can limit strategic freedom and why resilience should be designed around adaptability rather than control. The session combines strategic storytelling, practical examples, and actionable frameworks that help organizations evaluate their resilience against cyber, operational, regulatory, and geopolitical disruption. The central message is simple: The goal is not absolute control. The goal is preserving optionality. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 50 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/G3LJMT/ Main Hall Kim van Wilgen PUBLISH CPTZQC@@program.wiccon.nl -CPTZQC Misbehaving while awake: nRF52810 Runtime EM Fault Injection APPROTECT Bypass - (CVE-2025-9709) en en 20261029T153000 20261029T162000 0.05000 Misbehaving while awake: nRF52810 Runtime EM Fault Injection APPROTECT Bypass - (CVE-2025-9709) While trying to reproduce CVE-2020-27211 by LimitedResults, I discovered a novel, triggerless runtime attack on Nordic Semi's nRF52810 System-on-Chip (SoC) using electromagnetic (EM) fault injection. Unlike conventional approaches, this technique requires neither precise timing nor accurately synchronized EM pulses, making it remarkably simple and reproducible. Given the correct injection location, the attack succeeds on average with the first pulse. This is the first triggerless runtime attack ever reported. I will walk you through the research process and discuss where this work could lead next. This issue was recognized by Toreon as CVE-2025-9709. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 50 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/CPTZQC/ Main Hall g0mb4ck PUBLISH 8J8XPT@@program.wiccon.nl -8J8XPT Supabase Shenaningans: Extended Edition en en 20261029T163000 20261029T165500 0.02500 Supabase Shenaningans: Extended Edition This talk covers two real-world penetration testing engagements conducted within the same week, both targeting applications built on Supabase. The findings were independently discovered, disclosed responsibly, and are now public on skelli.win. The talk covers how Supabase's permissive defaults work and why they exist, the architectural mistake of rolling custom auth instead of using Supabase Auth, common RLS policy gaps, remediation patterns for Supabase developers, and what good responsible disclosure looks like from both sides. The intended audience is anyone who builds with or recommends modern BaaS platforms, and anyone interested in how subtle architectural decisions create severe vulnerabilities. Technical enough for practitioners, accessible enough for developers just starting to think about security. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 25 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/8J8XPT/ Main Hall Eden Stroet PUBLISH 9QXSDG@@program.wiccon.nl -9QXSDG Well behaved women seldom make history en en 20261029T170000 20261029T172500 0.02500 Well behaved women seldom make history The industry loves to tell women to adapt. Be less loud. Less confrontational. Dress differently. Speak differently. Be more strategic. Be less emotional. So I tried that. Spoiler: it doesn’t work. Because the problem isn’t how women behave. The problem is the system evaluating them. This talk isn’t about how I beat that system. It’s about what happens when you stop pretending the system works. It’s about the quiet ways talented people are pushed out of cybersecurity, and why the industry keeps reproducing the same leadership over and over again. And it’s about what we can actually do instead: amplify each other, open doors when we have the chance, and refuse to sand down the sharp edges that made us good at this job in the first place. Cybersecurity loves talking about breaking systems. Maybe it’s time we start with this one. Cybersecurity loves to believe it’s a meritocracy. Work hard, be good at what you do, and the best person gets the job. But what happens when the system evaluating talent is broken? In this talk, a CISO with more than a decade of experience shares a series of personal stories from inside the industry: interviewing for jobs that never existed, being told she might become a CISO one day while already being one, and failing a full-day assessment that never tested a single cybersecurity skill. These experiences reveal uncomfortable truths about how hiring, assessments, and leadership selection actually work in cybersecurity, and who gets left behind. This is not a talk about fixing yourself to fit the system. It’s a bug report about the system itself. Expect sharp edges, uncomfortable lessons, and a call to start hacking the culture of our own industry. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 25 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/9QXSDG/ Main Hall Fleur van Leusden PUBLISH ZQY987@@program.wiccon.nl -ZQY987 Social engineering techniques of hacking a human being en en 20261029T103000 20261029T123000 2.00000 Social engineering techniques of hacking a human being 1. What is social engineering? Examples. 2. Becoming Anyone you want to be - Pretexting. 3. Four Phases of Social Engineering (Reconnaissance, Engagement, Exploitation, Closure); 4. Building your artwork: What is elicitation? Elicitation Techniques. 5. I know how to make you like me: Building Rapport. 6. Examples of Real Social Engineering Attacks. 7. Now What? Skills you need to become a social engineer, and how to defend yourself. 8. Conclusion, final thoughts The person listening to my talk will end it with tangible knowledge on social engineering and places to go if they want to learn more. This workshop will include working in groups, and challenges for attendees - to gain some real skills, and better memorization of the techniques presented. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Workshop 120 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/ZQY987/ Workshop Room Dorota Kozlowska PUBLISH BQV3AJ@@program.wiccon.nl -BQV3AJ Want to play a game? en en 20261029T133000 20261029T143000 1.00000 Want to play a game? This talk is about what happens when the playbook breaks. Not the plan written down, but the reflex underneath it. In gamified fully-immersive simulations we put teams in a room with a live SIEM, a hacker on the chat, social media on fire, a regulator on hold and a ransom on the table. No pause. The clock runs. The information keeps changing. What we see in that room is not what people tell themselves they would do. What I'll show you today is what really decides how a team gets through it: The patterns we watch for during a simulation, scored in the moment so we can come back three months later and see who got sharper. And you won't be sitting still for all of it either. Somewhere in this hour you'll be asked to make a decision you can't unmake. No saws. No lost legs. Just the clock, what you don't know yet, and no one but you to make that call. The same call those teams faced. I won't tell you what they decided. You'll have to come see for yourself… PUBLIC CONFIRMED Workshop 60 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/BQV3AJ/ Workshop Room Kaja Möller PUBLISH 9MB79U@@program.wiccon.nl -9MB79U Coverage-guided Fuzzing en en 20261029T153000 20261029T170000 1.03000 Coverage-guided Fuzzing Fuzz testing is a broad area of software testing that involves making many, (informed) random mutations on input with the goal of finding bugs. This workshop focuses on coverage-guided fuzzing methodologies where the path a program takes for specific inputs is used to decide which inputs to further mutate. This method of testing allows for gaining more coverage across the program faster but requires specific preparation for the target. The following topics will be covered during the session: - Compiling an instrumented binary - Creating an initial corpus - Perform coverage-based fuzzing - Interpreting results For this workshop no prior fuzzing knowledge is required, but limited familiarity with C and basic understanding of memory layout are assumed. IMPORTANT: The workshop requires a laptop with Docker installed. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Workshop 120 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/9MB79U/ Workshop Room Sebastiaan Groot Frank Cozijnsen PUBLISH YJJ3DR@@program.wiccon.nl -YJJ3DR The Dark Spell of Trust: How Secure Systems become Enablers of Financial Crime en en 20261030T100000 20261030T102500 0.02500 The Dark Spell of Trust: How Secure Systems become Enablers of Financial Crime In Cyber Security, we design controls assuming attackers are already inside, identities can be compromised, and systems—even trusted ones—can be manipulated. Financial crime frameworks have evolved differently. Across AML, fraud, sanctions, and anti-bribery & corruption (ABC), controls are built on a more implicit assumption: that identities are real, data is accurate, and systems provide a reliable view of reality. Risk is detected through patterns, rules, and known typologies—often after events have already taken place. This session explores what happens when these two worlds meet. Using real-world examples and cross-domain insights, we will examine how modern attack techniques—such as identity compromise, synthetic identities, data manipulation, and abuse of legitimate access—can quietly undermine financial crime controls. In these scenarios, systems continue to operate as designed, transactions appear legitimate, and decisions remain “compliant”—while financial crime risk unfolds undetected beneath the surface. The talk will: - Compare the core assumptions of cybersecurity and financial crime frameworks - Explore how “trusted systems” can become enablers of AML breaches, fraud, sanctions evasion, and corruption risk - Highlight what cybersecurity can learn from financial crime disciplines, including decision accountability and risk assessment under uncertainty - Translate these insights into practical actions for CISOs and security teams—focusing on identity trust, data integrity, and cross-domain detection - Challenge the audience to rethink how signals, systems, and trust models should be connected This is not a compliance session. It is a conversation about trust. And how both cybersecurity and financial crime functions must evolve together to respond. This session is an invitation for cybersecurity professionals to extend their thinking beyond infrastructure and to play a critical role in preventing financial crime risks that traditional controls were never designed to detect. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 25 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/YJJ3DR/ Main Hall Caroline PUBLISH MFEAAW@@program.wiccon.nl -MFEAAW War and Unpeace: How Russia became one of the world's most advanced cyber threat actors en en 20261030T103000 20261030T112000 0.05000 War and Unpeace: How Russia became one of the world's most advanced cyber threat actors Russia's emergence as a top-tier cyber threat actor is not a coincidence or a purely technical achievement — it is the product of a historically grown state logic in which geopolitical ambitions, economic constraints, and a deep cultural distrust converge. This talk traces that logic across five interconnected dimensions: the Soviet and post-Soviet institutional heritage, economic marginalisation, political consolidation under Putin, socio-cultural narratives of encirclement, and deliberate technological capacity-building. The Ukrainian war serves as the critical stress test — revealing both the destructive potential and the surprising limitations of Russian cyber operations in a combined-arms conflict. Russia's Tactics, Techniques and Procedures are then examined through this strategic lens, showing how they reflect not random aggression but a coherent, if sometimes failing, doctrine. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 50 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/MFEAAW/ Main Hall Dominique Heuff PUBLISH DEJSUZ@@program.wiccon.nl -DEJSUZ The end of human pentesting? en en 20261030T113000 20261030T122000 0.05000 The end of human pentesting? Everyone is asking whether AI will replace hackers. Most answers come from vendors selling platforms, analysts writing reports, or defenders worried about their budgets. This one comes from someone who actually built the thing and ran it against real targets. The results are unsettling in ways nobody is talking about yet. Not because AI is as good as the pitch decks claim, but because the gap between what it can do and what it cannot do reveals something important about where offensive expertise actually lives in 2026. This talk is practical, opinionated, technical and built on real experience. You will leave knowing exactly which parts of your workflow to hand to a machine, which parts to protect fiercely, and why the most dangerous person in the room is not the one with the biggest toolset. Come with curiosity. Leave with a new way of thinking about what it means to be a hacker today. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 50 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/DEJSUZ/ Main Hall An Van Leuven PUBLISH DGAYA3@@program.wiccon.nl -DGAYA3 I jailbroke a scam bot with 1 prompt, and so can you en en 20261030T133000 20261030T142000 0.05000 I jailbroke a scam bot with 1 prompt, and so can you Modern LLM deployments aren't risky because of the model - they're risky because of what the model is connected to and how we try to put guardrails around them. You no longer have to imagine a machine with agency over your emails, calendars, Slack, Jira, Confluence, and GitHub because we already live in that reality. I explore how these systems delight users with unexpected solutions, and how users become comfortable (or fatigued) with giving more and more access. The moment a system can read untrusted content, access private data, and communicate externally, you've got indirect prompt injection as a feature no matter how well-aligned the model is. I'll walk through how malicious instructions get in and how stolen data gets out through those same integrations. Then we'll get to the part I find most interesting: you often don't need to make the model do anything obviously malicious. Each legitimate tool an LLM has like a code execution sandbox, file access, crypto functions, and web requests become the capabilities we take advantage of. Chain them in the right order and you get outcomes the developers never imagined. I'll cover sequential tool-chaining attacks, where individually harmless steps add up to data held hostage. I'll also spend time on the things that make this work in practice. Why a prompt that fails ninety-nine times succeeds on the hundredth, is still a vulnerability. And why you should treat everything a bot tells you about itself as a lead, never a fact, because LLMs "hallucinate" information about themselves, and lie with total confidence. You'll leave with concrete testing and design techniques you can use the next time you're handed an AI-powered application and asked whether it's safe. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 50 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/DGAYA3/ Main Hall Yianna Paris PUBLISH ZU83AN@@program.wiccon.nl -ZU83AN The largest social engineering attack ever? The hidden effects of AI on the human mind en en 20261030T143000 20261030T145500 0.02500 The largest social engineering attack ever? The hidden effects of AI on the human mind Besides my daily work as a data and AI consultant I have a handful of eclectic interests: a hobby level interest in social engineering, a single course in tradecraft and a year of psychology. Lately I noticed an overlap I had not expected. As cyber security experts know, humans are a great attack surface, and social engineering can be an incredibly effective attack. There are the corporate clichés of the classic phishing email, or the phone call from a very polite supposed customer with a really urgent issue and maybe a screaming infant in the background. Then there are the classic consumer facing attacks, like calls from someone impersonating a loved one who urgently needs money, or “Windows” calling your grandmother personally to help with that unknown danger on her computer. What gets talked about far less is long-game social engineering. Slowly gaining someone's trust, building rapport over time. Bit by bit their opinions start to carry weight, they start to matter to you, and you find their input invaluable. In the corporate world this may be a new coworker playing a long game and has a surprising amount of overlap with some parts of tradecraft. So where is the overlap with AI? Strangely large language models have been pulling a lot of the same levers in their large customer base for a while now. While the goal is unclear there is the classic large scale gathering of information, the winning of trust through manufactured authority, the relationship building through sycophancy, and manufactured urgency (largely from 3rd parties) to “adopt AI now to boost your productivity”. What we end up with are study after study on the effects of long-term AI use on human thinking, human skills, human isolation, and in the most extreme cases reported AI psychosis. I am not claiming there is some big conspiracy underfoot. I am pointing out that the disproportionate effects LLMs are having on people may lie in the disproportionate overlap their behaviours have with known techniques from social engineering and tradecraft for the explicit manipulation of humans. I will also touch on some old-school intelligence methods for keeping human judgement intact under surprisingly similar kinds of pressure. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 25 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/ZU83AN/ Main Hall Monika Stewart PUBLISH PSBEKS@@program.wiccon.nl -PSBEKS What Negotiation Chats Reveal About Ransomware-as-a-Service en en 20261030T153000 20261030T162000 0.05000 What Negotiation Chats Reveal About Ransomware-as-a-Service During my placement at the West Midlands Regional Cyber Crime Unit within West Midlands Police, I gained first-hand insight into the realities of ransomware incidents and became particularly interested in how modern ransomware groups operate less like isolated hackers and more as sophisticated criminal enterprises. This talk draws on research I have conducted into ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) groups, including analysis of victim leak sites, ransom notes, and real negotiation chats associated with groups such as Scattered Spider and Akira. The presentation will explore what negotiation chats reveal about extortion tactics and the use of human psychology to apply pressure during incidents. Using a real negotiation case study, I will highlight indicators of manipulation and operational structure within these groups. The talk will also challenge common misconceptions about ransomware and show how understanding attacker behaviour can strengthen organisational preparation. It will conclude with lessons for organisations on response planning and reducing the impact of ransomware attacks. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 50 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/PSBEKS/ Main Hall Becky Stacey PUBLISH 9DDU73@@program.wiccon.nl -9DDU73 The Attacker Posted First: The Breach Wasn't the Expensive Part en en 20261030T163000 20261030T165500 0.02500 The Attacker Posted First: The Breach Wasn't the Expensive Part This talk looks at case studies like the 2014 Ukraine elections and the 2023 MGM Resorts breach to discuss how cyber operations and narrative attacks can get synchronized on purpose, asking who in your crisis structure is actually responsible for closing that gap. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 25 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/9DDU73/ Main Hall Ieva Salnaite PUBLISH ZBZKTR@@program.wiccon.nl -ZBZKTR WICCON Closing en en 20261030T165500 20261030T170000 0.00500 WICCON Closing PUBLIC CONFIRMED Talk - 25 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/ZBZKTR/ Main Hall PUBLISH AJBMFK@@program.wiccon.nl -AJBMFK CTF introduction workshop with Challenge the Cyber en en 20261030T103000 20261030T123000 2.00000 CTF introduction workshop with Challenge the Cyber Get to know the Capture the flag (CTF) game without stressing out! In this workshop, we'll look at a couple of examples of CTF categories. After a short tech introduction, you'll practice solving a challenge. You can work togethere, there's people to help, the only thing you need to do is be brave and start hacking! We'll use challenges that have been used in former national Challenge the Cyber competitions. Probably of the following categories: - networking - reversing - crypto PUBLIC CONFIRMED Workshop 120 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/AJBMFK/ Workshop Room Maja Reissner Danique Lummen PUBLISH HV9H9C@@program.wiccon.nl -HV9H9C LLM Hacking and Latest vulnerabilities on AI agents - OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications en en 20261030T133000 20261030T150000 1.03000 LLM Hacking and Latest vulnerabilities on AI agents - OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications LLMs are no longer experimental — they are embedded in production systems, customer-facing products, and critical infrastructure. And yet, the security community is still catching up to what that actually means in practice. This workshop is designed to close that gap. We'll work through the complete OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025 edition) — not as a checklist, but as a hands-on investigation. Each vulnerability comes with real-world context, a live demonstration, and the kind of technical depth that turns awareness into action. But knowing isn't enough. That's why participants get access to a purpose-built hacking platform — a safe, interactive environment with no complex setup designed specifically for this workshop — where you can move from observer to attacker and experience each vulnerability firsthand. In the final chapter, we go beyond the OWASP list entirely. AI agents are introducing a new class of vulnerabilities that existing frameworks weren't built to handle. We'll look at what makes agentic architectures uniquely dangerous and discuss what defenders and developers need to start thinking about right now. Whether you're a security professional trying to stay ahead of the curve, a developer building on top of LLMs, or simply someone who wants to understand the risks before they become incidents — this workshop was built for you. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Workshop 120 minutes https://program.wiccon.nl/wiccon-2026/talk/HV9H9C/ Workshop Room Anca Maria Capota